Presupposition and Definite Descriptions

Philosophy of Language » Lecture 6

Semantic Accounts of Presupposition

Defining Entailment

Aside: Entailment and Logical Consequence

Semantic Presupposition

Presupposition Triggers

Names and Presuppositions

Presuppositions as Entailments…

…But Not Every Entailment: Projection

Presupposition and Negation

A Puzzle About Presupposition, Negation, and Possible Worlds

A Puzzle

Falsity, Non-Truth, Negation

Non-Bivalence and Truth-Value Gaps

a semantic view of presupposition … would seem to require that we abandon the concept of a two-valued logical system … and accept … a system with at least one intermediate value of ‘neither true nor false’. (Birner 2013: 149)

Negations

Table 1: Possible negations once gaps are on the scene.
\(P\) \(∼P\) (Kleene 1952) \(¬P\) (Bochvar 1937: 93) \(!P\) (Bochvar 1937: 91)
True False False False
Neither Neither True False
False True True True

Gaps and Presuppositions

Another Approach: Predicate Negation

Ambiguity and Predicate Negation

Presupposition and Predicate Negation

Internal negation

Cancellability and Semantic Presupposition

Cancellability

Metalinguistic negation

Metalinguistic Negation and Complementation

Cancellability again

Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatics

Definite Descriptions

The

Definite Descriptions and Proper Names

  1. Jonquil is asleep.

  2. The kid is asleep.

Two Theories of Descriptions

Puzzles for the Presupposition Theory

  1. The King of France does not exist.

Russell’s Analysis of Definite Descriptions

Evidence for Russell’s Analysis: False Definites

Evidence for Russell’s Analysis: Scope

Evidence for Russell’s Analysis: Descriptions as predicates

Our Puzzle Resolved

Entailment or Presupposition?

Attributive and Referential Uses of Descriptions

Attributive and Referential

Donnellan’s examples

suppose that Jones has been charged with Smith’s murder and has been placed on trial. Imagine that there is a discussion of Jones’s odd behavior at his trial. We might sum up our impression of his behavior by saying, “Smith’s murderer is insane.” If someone asks to whom we are referring, by using this description, the answer here is “Jones.” This, I shall say, is a referential use of the definite description.…

the same difference in use can be formulated for uses of language other than assertions. Suppose one is at a party and, seeing an interesting-looking person holding a martini glass, one asks, “Who is the man drinking a martini?” If it should turn out that there is only water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a question about a particular person, a question that it is possible for someone to answer. (Donnellan 1966: 285–86)

Communication and Speaker’s Reference

Presupposition Failure

Charitable Intepretation

Speaker’s Referent

Donnellan’s response

Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the king, but a usurper. Imagine also that his followers as firmly believe that he is the king. Suppose I wish to see this man. I might say to his minions, “Is the king in his countinghouse?” I succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing that he fits the description. It is not even necessary, moreover, to suppose that his followers believe him to be the king. If they are cynical about the whole thing, know he is not the king, I may still succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to. Similarly, neither I nor the people I speak to may suppose that anyone is the king and, finally, each party may know that the other does not so suppose and yet the reference may go through. (Donnellan 1966: 290–91)

References

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