Metaphysics and Epistemology Reading Group Adelaide

About

The Metaphysics and Epistemology Reading Group Adelaide (MERGA) is a reading group for all things metaphysics and epistemology. It is convened by Antony Eagle at the University of Adelaide, and is open to postgraduates and academic staff in Adelaide. The group will choose a theme each semester, and select readings in keeping with the theme each week. There is no intention that the selected readings should provide systematic coverage of the theme. There are no fixed restrictions on the themes, our intentions being to run with the interests of the group.

Meetings this semester take place on Tueday 12:00–14:00, normally weekly. We meet in the philosophy tea room, Napier 718. Feel free to bring your lunch.

Each meeting is based on a reading which will have been read beforehand, usually a journal article or a chapter from a book. Meetings begin with a volunteer giving a brief introduction to the reading, followed by a lively discussion.

Readings

Semester 1, 2019: Time and related issues

June 18
Meghan Sullivan (2012) ‘The Minimal A-Theory’ Philosophical Studies 158: 149–74.
This will be the last meeting for semester 1.
June 11
No meeting (week of postgrad colloquium)
June 4
Dean W Zimmerman (2005) ‘The A‐Theory of Time, The B‐Theory of Time, and “Taking Tense Seriously”’ dialectica 59: 401–57.
May 30
Antony Eagle (2010) ‘Perdurance and Location’, pp. 53–94 in Dean W Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 5, Oxford University Press.
There is also a reply by Gilmore, and a reply to the reply by Eagle, following in the same volume.
May 23
Cody Gilmore (2007) ‘Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence’, pp. 177–98 in Dean W Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press.
May 16, 2019
Caspar Hare (2009) On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press, chs. 5–7, pp. 57–98.
May 7, 2019
Caspar Hare (2009) On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press, chs. 3–4, pp. 19–55.
April 30, 2019
Caspar Hare (2009) On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press, chs. 1–2, pp. 1–18.
April 23, 2019
No meeting (Easter break)
April 16, 2019
Kristie Miller (2017) ‘Is Some Backwards Time Travel Inexplicable?’ American Philosophical Quarterly 54: 131–41.
April 9, 2019
David Lewis (1976) ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 145–52.
April 2, 2019
DH Mellor (2002) Real Time II, Routledge, chs. 3, 4 and 6, pp. 29–46 and 58–69.
March 26, 2019
Ned Markosian (1993) ‘How Fast Does Time Pass?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 829–44.
March 19, 2019
LA Paul (2010) ‘Temporal Experience’, Journal of Philosophy 107: 333–59.
March 12, 2019
Jenann Ismael (2011) ‘Temporal Experience’, pp. 460–82 in Craig Callendar (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, OUP.
March 5, 2019
Jill North (2011) ‘Time in Thermodynamics’, pp. 312–50 in Craig Callendar (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, OUP.
February 26, 2019
Huw Price (2011) ‘The Flow of Time’, pp. 276–311 in Craig Callendar (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, OUP. We’ll continue from §3.2 onwards.
February 19, 2019
Huw Price (2011) ‘The Flow of Time’, pp. 276–311 in Craig Callendar (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, OUP.

Semester 2, 2018: Mostly Grounding; some Temporal Parts and Mereology

December 12, 2018 – Final meeting for 2018
Thomas Hofweber (2009) ‘Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics’, pp. 260–89 in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
December 5, 2018
Jonathan Schaffer (2016) ‘Grounding in the image of causation’, Philosophical Studies 173: 49–100, §§3–4.
November 28, 2018
Jonathan Schaffer (2016) ‘Grounding in the image of causation’, Philosophical Studies 173: 49–100, §§1–2.
November 21, 2018
Jonathan Schaffer (2016) ‘Ground Rules’ pp. 143–69 in Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett (eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, Palgrave Macmillan.
November 14, 2018
No meeting
November 7, 2018
Jessica Wilson (2014) ‘No work for a theory of grounding’, Inquiry 57: 535–79.
Ricki Bliss and Kelly Trogdon (2016) ‘Metaphysical Grounding’, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
October 31, 2018
Kathrin Koslicki (2015) ‘The coarse-grainedness of grounding’, pp. 306–44 in Karen Bennett and Dean W Zimmerman (eds.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 9, Oxford University Press.
October 24, 2018
Kit Fine (2012) ‘Guide to Ground’, pp. 37–80 in Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.) Metaphysical Grounding, Cambridge University Press.
October 17, 2018
Kit Fine (1994) ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1–16.
October 10, 2018
Dorr ‘To be F is to be G’ continued from September 26.
October 3, 2018
No meeting (Australian Philosothon)
September 26, 2018
Cian Dorr (2017) ‘To Be F Is To Be G’, Philosophical Perspectives 30: 39–134. [The appendix is definitely optional!]
September 19, 2018
Elizabeth Barnes (2018) ‘Symmetric Dependence’, pp. 50–69 in Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest (eds.) Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality, Oxford University Press.
September 12, 2018
Gideon Rosen (2010) ‘Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction’, pp. 109–36 in Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford University Press.
September 5, 2018
Karen Bennett (2004) ‘Spatiotemporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem’, Philosophical Studies 118: 339–71.
August 29, 2018
No meeting
August 22, 2018
Eric T Olson (2006), ‘The Paradox of Increase’ The Monist 89: 390–417.