Metaphysics » Lecture 12
The strongest argument for the existence of free will…: moral responsibility requires free will and we are responsible for at least some of the things we have brought about. … Suppose there were arguments for determinism that were rationally more compelling than this argument for free will … then we should be rationally compelled to reject the thesis of the reality of moral responsibility. Such a conclusion might lead us to reopen the question of [compatibilism]. For … however plausible the premisses of our various arguments for incompatibilism may be, their denials are not nearly as implausible as the thesis that there is no such thing as moral responsibility. But [we should reopen the question] only if we can discover arguments for determinism whose premisses are more plausible than the premisses of our arguments for incompatibilism. (van Inwagen 1983: 188–89)
One strand of argument for determinism is entirely a priori: it uses Leibniz’ Principle of Sufficient Reason to show determinism.
If determinism were false, then two possible worlds would exist, with a shared past and divergent futures. Consider the point in time immediately prior to the divergence; does any sufficient reason obtain at that point for one future rather than the other? It cannot, otherwise only one of those futures would be possible (the other being excluded by that factor). Hence the PSR is false.
By contraposition, if the PSR is true, determinism is true.
This argument isn’t watertight (what if the needed sufficient reason comes after the time of divergence?)
PSR must be rejected, for it has an absurd consequence: the collapse of all modal distinctions. (van Inwagen 1983: 202–3)
We need two supplementary principles:
Consider \(P\), ‘the conjunction of all contingently true propositions’. If PSR is true, \(P\) has a sufficient reason, \(S\).
So there can be no such \(S\), contrary to the PSR. The only way out is to deny that there is any such \(P\) – but then, implausibly, every truth would be necessary (van Inwagen 1983: 203–4).
There would seem to be two ways in which scientific evidence could convince us we are determined; first, we might believe this … on the basis of our most general physical theories (which apply to all physical systems and hence to us); secondly, we might believe this on the basis of the empirical study of man [sic]. But our most general physical theories are no longer deterministic. And the empirical study of man has a long way to go before it will be in a position to tell us anything about whether we are or are not determined. (van Inwagen 1983: 201–2)
We turn to quantum mechanics below.
First: do the human sciences, particularly psychology, give us grounds to think we are determined? Recall in this connection Hume:
the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform, as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature. (Hume 1777: §8.16)
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is indeterministic. (van Inwagen 1983: 191)
Though quantum mechanics may be a deterministic theory, it seems to me to be wholly implausible to suppose that its truth entails determinism. This would be a plausible supposition if all the properties of a physical system at a moment were determined by its quantum-mechanical state at that moment. This, however, does not seem to be the case, since the properties a macroscopic object can actually be observed to possess at a given moment do not in general follow from the quantum-mechanical state of that object … at that moment. Rather, there is in general only a statistical correlation between an object’s being in a certain quantum-mechanical state … and its possessing a determinate observable or measurable property. (van Inwagen 1983: 193)
Van Inwagen thus rejects this thesis, the eigenvalue-eigenstate link:
Van Inwagen thinks that a system can be in a determinate macroscopic state without being in an eigenstate of that property, so can have a macro property even though there is only a ‘statistical correlation’ between the macro property and the microstate.
Here is one thesis van Inwagen seems to be attracted to which violates (EEL):
we have properties that do not supervene upon the properties of the atoms that we consist of. (van Inwagen 1983: 217)
Wave-function-only theories, like the many-worlds view, are deterministic, as is Bohm’s theory.
Collapse theories are indeterministic, as is van Inwagen’s own view – since the prior quantum state does not determine the posterior total state (though the dynamics of the quantum state are governed by the Schrödinger equation).
Although it is not clear what the quantum theory implies about determinism, it is clear that the implications are potentially profound. Bringing the implications into sharper focus requires a simultaneous focusing of a host of other foundational issues, most especially concerning the nature of quantum magnitudes and the nature of the quantum measurement process. By now it is no surprise that pressing the question of determinism has helped to unearth the deepest and most difficult problems that challenge our understanding of the theory. (Earman 1986: 233)
We all believe that responsibility exists. … if we examine our convictions honestly and seriously and carefully, we shall discover that we cannot believe that this assent is merely something forced upon us by our nature and the nature of human social life…. I think that we shall discover that we cannot but view our belief in moral responsibility as a justified belief, a belief that is simply not open to reasonable doubt. …
It is as adequate a defense of the free-will thesis as has ever been given for any philosophical position to say, ‘Without free will, we should never be morally responsible for anything; and we are sometimes morally responsible’. (van Inwagen 1983: 209)
Surely this cannot succeed! If this argument works, then armchair reflection on responsibility can secure the falsity of a purely scientific hypothesis about motion; this latter is surely an empirical thesis, and cannot be resolved by armchair techniques – the philosopher has overstepped their bounds.
I believe I would say that (\(\beta\)) was, after all, invalid. [And so he would reject the argument for incompatibilism.] … I have defended (\(\beta\)) entirely on a priori grounds. But it would not surprise me too much to find that this proposition, which at present seems to me to be a truth of reason, had been refuted by the progress of science. Such refutations have happened many times. And it does not follow from the fact that they have happened that there is anything wrong with accepting on a priori grounds a principle that later turns out to be empirically refutable. One must simply realize that a priori convictions are as corrigible as any others. (van Inwagen 1983: 219–21)
The more precisely science locates man in nature the more difficult it becomes to sustain a sense of autonomy for human actions. As autonomy shrinks so does our sense of uniqueness and worth as well as the basis for a moral perspective on human action. As I have tried to indicate, this difficulty would arise even if the ultimate laws of nature proved to be non-deterministic, but since determinism poses the difficulty in its sharpest form it is appropriate to continue to speak of the determinism-free will problem. As a practical ‘solution’ I recommend the ostrich tactic: don’t think too closely or too long on the issues raised here, and in daily life continue with the presumption that the ‘I’ that chooses and the self to which we attach value judgments are autonomous. Let those who want to call themselves philosophers bear the risk to their mental health that comes from thinking too much about free will. (Earman 1986: 249–50)