Metaphysics » Lecture 1
Kaurna miyurna, Kaurna yarta, ngai tampinthi
[Kaurna people, Kaurna country, I recognise]
I wish to acknowledge that these course materials were prepared on the traditional Country of the Kaurna people of the Adelaide Plains. I recognise the past and ongoing attachment of Kaurna people to this country, and respect and value the significance of this relationship for Kaurna cultural and spiritual beliefs, both traditional and present in the lives of Kaurna people today.
It’s easy enough to list topics that are commonly discussed under the heading ‘metaphysics’: existence, being, possibility and necessity, freedom and determinism, mind and body, part and whole, constitution and composition, the nature of time and space, change and persistence over time, causation, laws, chance, properties, ….
But what makes these the special province of metaphysics? Surely metaphysics is not to be defined as ‘the study of things on the above list’!
[People] say that metaphysics is the study of “being qua being” (Aristotle, Metaphysics book IV). They say that it is the attempt to “get behind all appearances and describe things as they really are” (van Inwagen 1998: 11), and that it is the study of “what the world is like… as opposed to… how we think and talk about the world” (Sider, Hawthorne, and Zimmerman 2007: 1). They say that metaphysics is “inquiry into the most basic and general features of reality and our place in it (Kim and Sosa 1999: ix). They say that it is the study of “the fundamental structure of reality (Sider 2011: 1). And they say that is “about what grounds what. It is about the structure of the world. It is about what is fundamental, and what derives from it” (Schaffer 2009: 379).
(Bennett 2016: 28–29)
Jackson defines ‘serious metaphysics’ as the attempt to give
a comprehensive account of some subject-matter – the mind, the semantic, or, most ambitiously, everything – in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions….
Serious metaphysics… seeks comprehension in terms of a more or less limited number of ingredients, or anyway a smaller list [of kinds of things] than we started with. (Jackson 1998: 4–5)
In this sort of spirit, we might consider a first attempted definition:
Definition (1) may be too inclusive, since it fails to distinguish metaphysics from science (Bennett 2016: 29). Why isn’t inquiry into the fundamental entities and properties just doing fundamental physics? And why think the armchair inquiries of metaphysicians would be effective in revealing these sorts of facts?
Is it also too restrictive? Is there a fundamental level? Maybe it’s turtles all the way down! At least, this claim is conceivably true:
Metaphysical investigations begin with initial appearances. For instance, one of the metaphysical issues that we [will consider] begins with the appearance that we act freely sometimes; another of our issues begins with the appearance that there are properties that many things share. … In everyday life, these appearances are seldom questioned. In metaphysics, we investigate further. As we pursue a metaphysical topic, we seek to get beyond appearances. We consider arguments about how things really are. We seek to learn the reality of the situation. Reality may confirm initial appearances or it may undercut them. Either way, our goal is to find the ultimate reality. (Conee and Sider 2014: 233)
Again, (2) doesn’t distinguish metaphysics from science or other less academic areas of inquiry: aren’t physicists, geologists, detectives, etc., all trying to figure out what is really going on?
Two options present themselves:
We can investigate these proposals in turn.
Clearly, almost all (ahem, all) philosophers use a priori reasoning. But metaphysicians frequently use it … to justify claims about what exists, about what objective reality is like. Not all metaphysicians, of course … but it would be farcical to try to deny that broader uses of a priori reasoning are widespread in contemporary metaphysics. We make largely a priori arguments for and against the truth of the principle of unrestricted composition, and hence what composite objects exist. We make largely a priori arguments for and against the existence of nonactual possible worlds, other times, and abstract entities. And so on. But, goes the complaint, this is misusing a methodology if anything is! (Bennett 2016: 26)
Metaphysics is about what could be and what must be. Except incidentally, metaphysics is not about explanatorily ultimate aspects of reality that are actual, but need not have existed. Metaphysics is about some actual things, [but] only because whatever is necessary has got to be actual and whatever is possible might happen to be actual. This allows us to say that physics pursues the question of what the basic constitution of reality actually is, while metaphysics is about what it must be and what it could have been. (Conee and Sider 2014: 236)
This idea of metaphysics – inquiry into what is possible, in order to figure out the essences of things – explains part of metaphysics.
But our definition (2) gives a role to appearances too: how things appear needs to be explained and accommodated, not merely cast aside in our quest for ‘ultimate reality’.
Most metaphysicians accordingly endorse a criterion of theory choice in metaphysics something like this:
One metaphysical system is superior to another in scope in so far as it allows for the statement of satisfactory philosophical theories on more subjects – theories that preserve, in the face of puzzle and apparent contradiction, most of what we take ourselves to know (Loux and Zimmerman 2003: 5).
The atoms that make up matter never touch each other. The closer they get, the more repulsion there is between the electrical charges on their component parts. … This even applies when objects appear to be in contact. When you sit on a chair, you don’t touch it. You float a tiny distance above, suspended by the repulsion between atoms. (Clegg 2013)
This is a bit of amateur metaphysics. There is a puzzle here: how do we reconcile the appearances of contact, with the physics of repulsion?
The argument relies on something like this account of touching – an account of what it is for things to touch:
But (5) is a pretty terrible theory.
We ought to replace (5) with something like:
This is physically respectable and retains most of our ordinary beliefs about which things touch each other.
Is this method dubious (Ladyman and Ross 2007)? It might be if (i) we don’t know anything to start with, or (ii) we are bad at coming up with or describing possible cases, or (iii) poor at reasoning.
But in fact there is considerable evidence that we are good at these things outside of the metaphysics classroom; and that all that is going inside the metaphysics room is just the careful and systematic application of patterns of reasoning that are necessary and important to us outside of it:
… we can do philosophy on the basis of general cognitive capacities that are in no deep way peculiarly philosophical (Williamson 2008: 178).
So much for this ‘metametaphysics’: from now, we will simply use this sort of abstract method to decide some first-order metaphysical issues.
Lewis says that time travel
inevitably involves a discrepancy between time and time. Any traveler departs and then arrives at his destination…. If he is a time traveler, the separation in time between departure and arrival does not equal the duration of the journey. (Lewis 1976: 145)
What about cases of backward time travel where I travel for an hour into the past, and it takes an hour? We need to treat duration as ‘signed’, or having direction, so the separation is +1 hour of travel, -1 hour difference between arrival and departure. (And of course we must keep the time zones constant too!)
This gives rise to the first paradox of time travel: ‘How can it be that the same two events, his departure and his arrival, are separated by two unequal amounts of time?’ (Lewis 1976: 145).
Do the two temporal gaps merely indicate two different dimensions of distance?
But, Lewis points out, this won’t give us time travel – for example, one doesn’t end up in the same place you were when you supposedly travel back in time: you are
no longer separated from [your childhood playmates] along one of the dimensions of time, but … still separated from them along the other. (Lewis 1976: 145)
A time traveler who talks to himself … looks for all the world like two different people talking to each other.… What’s true is that he, unlike the rest of us, has two different complete stages located at the same time at two different places. What reason have I, then, to regard him as one person and not two? What unites his stages, including the simultaneous ones, into a single person (Lewis 1976: 147)
Both scenarios involve discontinuous aggregates of person stages. The sceptical worry is that there is no difference between them, because there is no difference in what’s happening at each point in time on either.
However, if the alternative description is true, the scenario involves extraordinary ‘people’ and is sheer coincidence that some earlier stages of \(X\) resembles the later stages of \(Y\).
But in a case of genuine time travel, this is no coincidence: the features of later stages of \(Y\) cause features of the earlier stages of \(X\):
The connectedness and continuity are not accidental.… they are explained by the fact that the properties of each stage depend causally on those of the stages just before in personal time, the dependence being such as tends to keep things the same (Lewis 1976: 147).
Some might concede all this, but protest that the impossibility of time travel is revealed after all when we ask not what the time traveler does, but what he could do. Could a time traveler change the past? It seems not: the events of a past moment can no more change than numbers could. Yet it seems he would be as able as anyone to do things that would change the past if he did them. If a time traveler visiting the past both could and couldn’t do something that would change it, then there cannot possibly be such a time traveler. (Lewis 1976: 149)
Many incoherent time travel stories involve changing the past. But: past events can’t change, because they are momentary and cannot exhibit variation (nor, therefore, change) over their one stage.
It also follows from the 4D framework; to change the past would involve it being true at \(t\) that \(A\), and ‘then’ (in some sense later) false at \(t\) that \(A\); but it is not possible for contradictions to be true. So any truth about the past remains eternally true, and cannot be changed.
Indeed, this is true of any time:
no more can anyone change the present or the future… You cannot change a present or future event from what it was originally to what it is after you change it. What you can do is to change the present or the future from the unactualized way they would have been without some action of yours to the way they actually are. (Lewis 1976: 150)
So Tim can’t change the past – no one can. But what explains the appeal of the thought that Tim can (in virtue of motive, means, opportunity)?
Lewis’ answer: can is equivocal – it is said in two meanings in the two premises which generate the paradox, and once we identify this, we can see that both premises can be truly said, but their conjunction cannot be truly said.
How? It’s like these cases: I say I am tall; you say I am short. Both can be truly said; yet their conjunction cannot be truly said, by anyone: I am tall and I am short is a flat out contradiction.
The resolution: I is equivocal, meaning different things in the mouths of different speakers.
Lewis says: can is semantically a bit like I (see also Kratzer 1977; Portner 2009):
To say that something can happen means that its happening is compossible with certain facts. Which facts? That is determined, but sometimes not determined well enough, by context.… What I can do, relative to one set of facts, I cannot do, relative to another, more inclusive, set. (Lewis 1976: 150)
Lewis’ flat-footed answer: facts about the past and present circumstances are relevant to an evaluation of ability. But
facts about the future of the time in question are … not the sort of facts we count as relevant in saying what Tom can do. (Lewis 1976: 151)
But in the case of time travellers this simple division is not readily applicable – for facts about the external future are facts about Tim’s personal past; and maybe these are relevant for the evaluation of Tim’s abilities. At least, they can more easily seem to be relevant, hence the possibility of equivocating without noticing.
Some question whether, even granting Lewis’ assumptions, time travellers can kill their ancestors (Vihvelin 1996; Sider 2002).