God, Faith and Infinity » Lecture 9
The will may also play a role in evaluative beliefs: beliefs not about how things are, but about whether it is good (or right, or important) that they be that way.
The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will. Are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or bad for us, but in themselves indifferent? How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one. (james-2014?)
A moral belief, for James, is linked to a disposition to respond in a particular way to some situation – positively or negatively. It is more an emotional habit than an evidence-based judgment.
James thinks religious options are momentous, forced, and live. Since they are also cases where the evidence is insufficient, we need passion to decide.
In part, this is because he thinks that a generic religious worldview is a moral hypothesis:
religion says essentially two things. … that the best things are the more eternal things … [and] that we are better off even now if we believe [the] first affirmation to be true. (james-2014?)
If he is right that moral options are decidable on passional grounds, and religion is a moral option, then we already see a role for the passions.
But there are also reasons distinctive to the religious hypothesis that make it a genuine option.
religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital option. Secondly, religion is a forced option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively choose to disbelieve. … Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of opinion; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error…. To preach scepticism to us as a duty until ‘sufficient evidence’ for religion be found, is tantamount to telling us … that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. (james-2014?)
An objection suggests itself:
This is all very well if religion just is a moral belief – e.g., the belief that our actions have meaning and significance beyond their mundane physical implications and effects.
But many religions also have consequences for how things are, not just how they ought to be regarded. They say that the world we see is the product of intentional action, that it was caused by a divine person, that supernatural explanation is legitimate, etc. How can our passional nature be involved here – esp. when James himself says that scientific options are generally not forced?
Can James – or a broadly Jamesian view – give a role to the passions in our theoretical beliefs?
But even if we shun ‘Shun Error’, there are many ways to implement ‘Seek Truth’.
One rule that has been proposed involves evidential support:
This rule invokes a notion of ‘on balance support’, which is often spelled out probabilistically: \(e\) supports \(p\) over \(¬p\) iff \(\Pr(p\mid e)>\Pr(¬p\mid e)\).
But where does this probability function come from? The subjective Bayesian approach says: it is your probabilities, your prior judgment of the impact of evidence on hypotheses (Howson and Urbach 1993).
If different people can rationally have different ‘priors’, that’s another way in which Uniqueness can fail, because there may be equally rational attitudes to \(p\) deriving from disagreement over whether the evidence supports \(p\).
To give an example closer to James’, which is more overtly normative or evaluative, we might consider this rule:
Perhaps following Simplicity could be described as making an epistemic decision based on one’s desire (or hope) for simplicity.
This is a rule for going beyond the evidence: a normative principle regulating the formation of belief which guides us in how to go beyond what we have sufficient evidence for.
Rules like Simplicity are intended to help us in theory choice when the evidence is indecisive (not even favouring one hypothesis over another).
But James thinks that sometimes the hypotheses you accept constrain the evidence you can get:
the evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way. (james-2014?)
This foreshadows a major theme of 20th century philosophy of science, the theory-dependence of observation. As Hanson puts it, ‘there is more to seeing than meets the eyeball’ (Hanson 1958, p. 7).
According to James, the religious worldview is an expansive one – it postulates a richer set of properties than its atheistic rival.
If we don’t accept that theory, we cannot see those richer properties in our observations (we cannot make observation reports employing that richer framework).
If so, even if the religious hypothesis were knowable, atheists would be unable to know it. Without access to the richer concepts it presupposes, they literally cannot see the theological evidence for what it is.
But when we are open to theism, we can see that even mundane experience indicates the involvement of God, as in Plantinga’s ‘reform epistemology’:
Calvin holds that God ‘reveals and daily discloses himself to the whole workmanship of the universe’ …. there is in us a disposition to believe propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this vast and intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches of the universe. (Plantinga 1981, p. 46)
James says this kind of case is a problem for Clifford’s rule, since that rule, strictly applied, would render us unable to get to the truth (at least, without epistemic fault) in cases where we don’t happen to believe the truth already.
I … cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth seeking, or wilfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game. I cannot do so for this plain reason, that a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule. (james-2014?)
Does this overgeneralise – including as rational too many beliefs? How do we distinguish misplaced passion for crazy theories from rational ways of going beyond the evidence?
One only has faith in matters of personal importance – as James observes, it is only momentous issues that seem to require a response akin to having faith.
Faith is expressed in action – having it makes a potential ‘difference to her behaviour’ (Buchak 2012, p. 226) (though it needn’t be and all-or-nothing matter, because the stakes seem to matter too).
We have faith only when we are uncertain ‘or when the evidence we have is inconclusive’ (Buchak 2012, p. 227) – we cannot have faith when we already know. Indeed,
having faith seems to involve going beyond the evidence in some way. (Buchak 2012, p. 227)
faith might require taking evidence into account in a particular way – a way that favours \(X\) or gives the truth of \(X\) the benefit of the doubt, so to speak. Following this line of thought, a third analysis of faith holds that faith requires setting one’s degree of belief to \(p(X) = 1\) prior to examining the evidence. On this view, one interprets evidence, not with an eye towards finding out whether or not \(X\) holds, but in light of the assumption that \(X\) does hold. On this view, we might say that faith goes before the evidence, not beyond it. (Buchak 2012, pp. 230–1)
A person has faith that \(X\), expressed by \(A\), if and only if that person performs act \(A\), and performing \(A\) constitutes taking a risk on \(X\); and the person prefers {to commit to \(A\) before he examines additional evidence} rather than {to postpone his decision about \(A\) until he examines additional evidence}. (Buchak 2012, p. 234)
Buchak with Clifford assumes evidentialism (Buchak 2012, p. 235): epistemic rationality involves proportioning one’s belief to the evidence.
On Buchak’s account, since having faith in \(X\) implies nothing about purely epistemic rationality:
whether one has faith is completely separate from whether one is epistemically rational. (Buchak 2012, p. 237)
But is faith prudentially rational?
If this is so, then the only time gathering further evidence isn’t a good idea is when there is a great cost to gathering the evidence; and since (for Buchak) having faith is precisely acting without gathering further evidence, faith will only be rational
in circumstances in which the costs of delaying the decision are high enough to outweigh the benefit of additional evidence. Holding fixed the costs of delay, whether these costs outweigh the benefits depends both on one’s credence in the proposition one has faith in and on one’s beliefs about the potential evidence one might encounter.
faith in \(X\) is rational only if the available evidence is such that no possible piece of evidence tells conclusively enough against \(X\). (Buchak 2012, pp. 244–6)
Faith is likely to be rational if potential evidence against \(X\) will be inconclusive, so that delay won’t noticeably improve your epistemic situation.
Religious faith is rational is when there isn’t much risk of further evidence changing one’s mind.
I don’t think that it is rationally permissible to believe that God exists when one does not have conclusive evidence, if this means setting one’s credences differently from what one has evidence for…. However, I do think that it is sometimes rationally permissible (and indeed, sometimes rationally required!) to have faith in God – as evidenced by doing some particular religious act without looking for further evidence – in circumstances in which postponing the decision to act is costly. (Buchak 2012, p. 243)
Since collecting evidence does have at least opportunity costs, faith is sometimes rational.
Epistemology Faith | Faith \(\Rightarrow\) Belief | Faith \(\not\Rightarrow\) Belief |
---|---|---|
Evidentialism | Clifford | Buchak |
Non-evidentialism | James | ? |