God, Faith and Infinity » Lecture 4
Mackie and many others propose an argument for the conclusion that God does not exist that is supposed to be persuasive to theists, because it is supposed to rest only on premises theists already accept.
The argument from evil attempts to turn an apparent tension between God’s goodness, God’s power, and the actual events of our world, into an argument that God can’t exist:
Terrible things happen: for example, innocent kids are killed in natural disasters. God doesn’t prevent them, so either he doesn’t want to or he can’t. He’s perfectly good; he would want to. So he must not be able to. If he exists, he can do anything. So the reason he can’t stop terrible evils is that he doesn’t exist.
Detailed versions of that argument come in two varieties:
Mackie intends it as persuasive: it is supposed to be one that even theists will accept.
A perfect being theism must accept M1 and M4.
The empirical premise M7 seems obviously true.
Mackie says of (M2) and (M5) that they are
quasi-logical rules connecting the terms ‘good’, ‘evil’, and ‘omnipotent’. (Mackie 1955: 201)
If Mackie is right, then the concept of God as an omnipotent (all powerful) and omnibenevolent (all good) being is in trouble – the existence of such a being is by itself inconsistent with the existence of evil.
Even if we reject a ‘quasi-logical’ status for those claims, their truth would still be bad news for perfect being theism.
A theistic solution to the challenge posed by Mackie’s argument will reject one of the premises (assuming we are dealing with a perfect being theist, so rejecting God’s perfection embodied in M1 and M4 is not on the table).
They can thus argue:
An approach of the third sort is called a theodicy: a justification for thinking that
for every actual evil found in the world, one can describe some state of affairs that … will provide an omnipotent and omniscient being with a morally sufficient reason for allowing the evil in question. (Tooley 2021: §4)
One idea about the afterlife: the blessed get to behold God’s face as their divine reward, while the wicked do not:
Rise up, Lord, confront them, bring them down; …
By your hand save me from such people, Lord, from those of this world whose reward is in this life.…
As for me, I will behold Thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with Thy likeness.Psalm 17:13–15)
If an eternity of contemplation of God is the best reward, despite having not much to do with what we ordinarily find pleasurable, maybe we just have the wrong idea about good and evil: maybe pain and suffering are not after all bad.
A theodicy aims to give ‘reasons that would suffice to justify an omnipotent and omniscient being in allowing all of the evils found in the world’ (Tooley 2021: §4).
Theodicies as responses to the problem of evil go back at least to Descartes (1641) and Leibniz (and earlier):
Leibniz:
the best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil, since it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good. For example, the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory. (Leibniz 1710: 378)
Here it is not merely that the victory is a larger good than the wound – it is supposed to be that the victory is a more important variety of good than the mere avoidance of injury would be.
Compare here Mill on higher pleasures (poetry over pushpin):
[i]t would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. … Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference … that is the more desirable pleasure. (Mill 1861: ch. II)
So we need some goods that are more worthy than first-order goods, and also essentially involve the sacrifice of undergoing some first-order evil.
Examples: the existence of sympathy, or heroism, or resisting temptation, or the ‘gradual overcoming of evil by good’ (Mackie 1955: 206).
Typically, we will need to say that it is not goodness or badness of individual acts which makes God’s decision about what kind of world to actualise: it is the goodness or badness of the universe as a whole that God considers.
The claim is: a world of wholly ‘good’ acts without freedom is worse than a world with some bad acts with freedom.
Implicit in the free will theodicy is the assumption that
it is better on the whole that men [sic] should act freely, and sometimes err, than that they should be innocent automata, acting rightly in a wholly determined way. (Mackie 1955: 208)
If compatibilism were true, people could have free will while God determines that they must exercise their will for good:
there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good. (Mackie 1955: 209)
We must be presupposing a libertarian conception of free will – free choices are purely the effect of the agent’s will, subject to no external control.
A world of wholly good acts, all done freely, would be best – but God cannot plan to make that world. To ensure those acts would undermine the libertarian freedom of its inhabitants.
What makes our world good (and better than any deterministic world), is that it could have evolved into the best, even if it did not.
It is of course possible that free choosers should always choose the good:
If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on several, occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. (Mackie 1955: 209)
But it must be possible for this world God has actualized, that its inhabitants sometimes choose the bad, else God would have actualized a world without free choice.
Many object to these kind of theodicies on the grounds that libertarian free will is incoherent, offering this sort of argument (Hobart 1934):
We also need what libertarians have so far failed to offer: ‘an understanding of what could lead us to want to say that an organism [rather than an event] has brought something about…’ (Steward 2012: 11); a metaphysically coherent account of agent causation
But even granting libertarianism, free will theodicy faces serious objections.
Constraint and coercion isn’t always bad, so it would in fact have been preferable for God to intervene to stop the bad consequences of our evil decisions:
very few people think that one should not intervene to prevent someone from committing rape or murder. … almost everyone would hold that a failure to prevent heinously evil actions when one can do so would be seriously wrong. (Tooley 2021: §7.2)
I can’t exercise voluntary control over all my bodily movements, but that doesn’t make me unfree. Why couldn’t God have made us free but unable to exercise voluntary control over murdering/torturing/etc. actions?
Many bad outcomes result from natural evils: childhood cancer, or death by tsunami, for example. How can human free will justify the existence of these evils?
I define ‘horrendous evils’ as ‘evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to one on the whole’. … horrendous evils seem … to engulf the positive value of a participant’s life. … most people would find in the doing or suffering of them prima facie reason to doubt the positive meaning of their lives. (Adams and Sutherland 2018: 299–300)
[Distinguish] between two dimensions of Divine goodness in relation to creation—viz., ‘producer of global goods’ and ‘goodness to’ or ‘love of individual created persons’… we may separate two problems of evil parallel to the two sorts of goodness mentioned ….
… establishing God’s excellence as a producer of global goods does not automatically solve the second problem, especially in a world containing horrendous evils. For God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils—that is, individuals within whose lives evils remain undefeated. … [G]lobal and generic approaches … fail to give satisfaction. …
Could the truck driver who accidentally runs over his beloved child find consolation in the idea that this … unintended side-effect was part of the price God accepted for a world with the best balance of moral good over moral evil He could get? (Adams and Sutherland 2018: 302–3)
Most theodicies are consequentialist – they allow God to trade off harms to individuals. But such theodicies
draw a picture of Divine indifference or even hostility to the human plight. Would the fact that God permitted horrors because they were constitutive means to His end of global perfection, or that He tolerated them because He could obtain that global end anyway, make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her? (Adams and Sutherland 2018: 303)
This is not just to prefer deontology to consequentialism – it is made sharper by the fact that God is supposed (particularly by Christians) to care, individually, for his creatures:
The Lord shall preserve your going out and your coming in, from this time forth, and even forevermore. (Psalm 121:8)
Adams herself argues that God can trade off past harms with future goods – so the promise of future reward may swamp harms suffered during life: ‘the good of beatific, face-to face intimacy with God is simply incommensurate with any … ills a person might experience’ (Adams and Sutherland 2018: 306–7).
But she goes further: a relationship with God may even confer ‘significant meaning and positive value even on horrendous suffering’ (Adams and Sutherland 2018: 309).
perhaps our deepest suffering as much as our highest joys may themselves be direct visions into the inner life of God… so any vision of God (including horrendous suffering) would have a good aspect insofar as it is a vision of God…. For the most part, horrors are not recognized as experiences of God…. But, Christian mysticism might claim … from the post-mortem perspective … such sufferings will be seen for what they were…. (Adams and Sutherland 2018: 308)
Rowe offers an argument proceeding from the premise that
- : There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. (Rowe 1979: 336)
This is to deny theodicy – and (for those who propose theodical responses to the logical argument from evil) if it were true, it would entail that God doesn’t exist, since a good God would have prevented such avoidable evils.
But whereas Mackie attempts to suppose an analogue of (i) is a quasi-logical truth, Rowe attempts to support it by appeal to plausibility considerations.
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless. … It must be acknowledged that the case of the fawn’s apparently pointless suffering does not prove that (i) is true.… But it is one thing to know or prove that (i) is true and quite another thing to have rational grounds for believing (i) to be true. …
Is it reasonable to believe that there is some greater good so intimately connected to that suffering that even an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have obtained that good without permitting that suffering or some evil at least as bad? It certainly does not appear reasonable to believe this. … In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief. (Rowe 1979: 337–38)
God, if we are to believe an orthodox story, has prescribed eternal torment as a punishment for insubordination. …
along both dimensions, time and intensity, the torment is infinitely worse than all the suffering and sin that will have occurred during the history of life in the universe. … God is supposed to torture the damned forever, and to do so by vastly surpassing all the modes of torment about which we know.
Although those who elaborate the orthodox account are sometimes concerned with the fit between crime and punishment, there is no possibility of a genuine balance. For the punishment of the damned is infinitely disproportionate to their crimes. (Lewis 2007: 232)
If damnation is not torment, it may not be evil to damn people without giving them a chance to avoid it.
Some say: it is merely the experience of being deprived of/insubordinate to God that is called ‘torment’ in scripture, but that is in fact mere metaphor.
This proposal depends on supposing that torment is an apt metaphor for insubordination.
I deny that it is. Contented atheist that I am, my state of alienation from the deity is not one for which torment is an apt metaphor. Christians may respond that this judgment is shallow: From my mundane perspective, I may judge myself happy enough in my denial of God. Once I am fully informed, however, I will appreciate the grossness of my swinish satisfaction, and torment will be an apt description of my insubordinate condition. …
But, as before, I have been placed in a dangerous situation… Once again, I have been treated unjustly. (Lewis 2007: 234–35)
Christianity, properly so-called, requires a redemption. At its heart is the claim that Jesus was born to save us from something. …
if there’s a redemption, there’ll have to be a distinction between those who take advantage of it and those who don’t. What happens to those who don’t? According to universalism, they are not to be punished. God will place them in some condition without perpetrating divine evil.
The afterlife is a more heterogeneous affair than people have thought. The point of our earthly lives isn’t to divide us into two groups, one to live forever in unimaginable bliss, the other to suffer unimaginable torment. Instead of being tried, we simply discover who we are. …
Not all of us are destined for Christian salvation, for God’s eternal Sabbath, but everyone will receive a well-adapted reward. God does not treat all of us alike. But there is no divine evil. (Lewis 2007: 237–38)