This is an edited collection of readings in the philosophy of probability. The volume was published by Routledge in 2011, in hardback and paperback. It is available for order from Amazon here: paperback or hardback. Here’s the publisher’s description:

Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics:

  • subjective probability and credence
  • probability updating: conditionalization and reflection
  • Bayesian confirmation theory
  • classical, logical, and evidential probability
  • frequentism
  • physical probability: propensities and objective chances.

The book features a useful primer on the mathematics of probability, and each section includes an introduction by the editor, as well as a guide to further reading. A broad-ranging and highly accessible exploration of the subject, Philosophy of Probability is ideal for any student of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, or philosophy of mathematics.

Alan Hájek was kind enough to provide a quote for the book:

‘The philosophy of probability has had a venerable history, but recently it has especially stepped into the limelight, and it is flourishing nowadays. This volume brings together both classics and cutting-edge contributions to its literature. Antony Eagle does an excellent job of orienting the reader by grouping these articles thematically, and by providing a panoramic and incisive introduction to each of the themes. A terrific resource — that’s a certainty.’

There were unfortunately some errors that were missed: Errata.

Table of Contents

    1. Primer on Probability Theory
  2. Degrees of Belief
    1. Introduction
    2. F. P. Ramsey, ‘Truth and Probability’
    3. Henry Kyburg, Jr., ‘Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections and Problems’
    4. James Joyce, ‘A Non-pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’
  3. Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection
    1. Introduction
    2. David Lewis, ‘Why Conditionalize?’
    3. Richard C. Jeffrey, ‘Probability Kinematics’
    4. Bas C. van Fraassen, ‘Belief and the Will’
    5. Patrick Maher, ‘Diachronic Rationality’
    6. Adam Elga, ‘Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem’
    7. Frank Arntzenius ‘Some problems for conditionalization and reflection’
    8. Darren Bradley and Hannes Leitgeb, ‘When betting odds and credences come apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments’
  4. Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory
    1. Introduction
    2. Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, ‘Bayesian versus non-Bayesian approaches’
    3. Clark Glymour, ‘Why I am not a Bayesian’
    4. Branden Fitelson and Ellery Eells, ‘Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support’
  5. Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference
    1. Introduction
    2. Bas C. van Fraassen, ‘Indifference: the symmetries of probability’
    3. Rudolf Carnap, ‘Statistical and Inductive Probability’
    4. David Stove, ‘Is the Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?’
  6. Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory
    1. Introduction
    2. Richard von Mises, ‘The Definition of Probability’
    3. Richard C. Jeffrey, ‘Mises Redux’
    4. Alan Hájek, ‘”Mises Redux” Redux: 15 Arguments Against Finite Frequentism’
    5. Alan Hájek, ’15 Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism’
  7. Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities
    1. Introduction
    2. David Lewis, ‘Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’
    3. Karl Popper, ‘A Propensity Interpretation of Probability’
    4. Ronald N. Giere, ‘Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics’
    5. Paul W. Humphreys, ‘Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities’
    6. Barry Loewer, ‘David Lewis’ Humean Theory of Objective Chance’
    7. Brian Skyrms, ‘Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity’