Choices, Models and Morals » Lecture 10
When access cannot be controlled (non-excludable goods), rational markets can’t exist – no one should exchange anything for a good they cannot be prevented from using – e.g., breathable air [].
But actually, almost everything can escape control. Few things can be linked inextricably with an individual by physical properties and yet also be exchanged.
So – as talk of property rights indicates – we generally have our control of objects granted to us by legislation and social convention. We, or our representatives, decide what things are under the control of an agent, and where necessary, enforce those decisions.
Systems of rights, created by tacit convention, thus enable markets:
While markets are exceptionally powerful social institutions, they cannot work unless government establish the necessary framework in which they can operate. The core of the economic framework in a market economy, and a central role of government, is the allocation and legal enforcement of property rights. (Quiggan 2019: 7)
One widely accepted requirement is to ensure that actual markets function as they ought.
This might be an economic ‘ought’, but there is a moral norm behind it.
In an optimal (efficient) market, participants can have their outcome preferences sustainably satisfied for the lowest possible cost. (Mathematical result)
Agents ought not to have to incur more costs than required for a given outcome. (Moral norm)
If an efficient allocation is possible, then we ought to promote it: ‘efficiency provides a reason to distribute goods through the market’ (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2017: 93). (1, 2)
For example: ‘an inefficient medical system means that people have to pay more for treatment or that they receive fewer treatments’ (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2017: 94), since costs they incur aren’t being used most efficiently to purchase medical services.
When markets are inefficient… freedom may be threatened, and it may be possible to make people better off by interfering with and regulating or preventing certain market interactions. (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2017: 95)
the [first] theorem assumes there are no externalities. In fact, if in an exchange economy person l’s utility depends on person 2’s consumption as well as his own, the theorem does not hold. … In a similar vein, the theorem assumes there are no public goods, that is, goods like national defence, judicial systems or lighthouses, that are necessarily non-exclusive in use. If such goods are privately provided (as they would be in a completely laissez-faire economy), then their level of production will be suboptimal.The [first] theorem assumes there are no public goods, that is, goods like national defence, judicial systems or lighthouses, that are necessarily non-exclusive in use. If such goods are privately provided (as they would be in a completely laissez-faire economy), then their level of production will be suboptimal. (Feldman 2008: 4)
But not every market failure can be solved by more markets.
If a market fails because it shouldn’t exist in the first place, then it will not be possible to remedy that by introducing more items to be traded.
A slave market, where human persons are the goods (their labour then extracted indefinitely for free) creates many negative externalities for society:
Enslavers do everything in their power to get society to pay for the high costs of controlling their human minions. Throughout history, including the U.S. antebellum South, enslavers used taxpayer monies to discipline their slaves, put down rebellions, return runaways, and so forth. They distorted republican governance processes to further their ends and deliberately stymied economic development (literacy, communications, transportation infrastructure, etc.)https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/165483
Pricing these externalities might ‘correct’ the market, making the slave trade uneconomical in the long run. But surely the long run isn’t short enough!