Choices, Models and Morals » Lecture 2
Philosophical suspicions notwithstanding, philosophers soon enough turned out accounts of how scientific information is used in giving explanations (Salmon 1989).
In all cases, this is explanation of a particular event, a ‘token phenomenonon’ (Reiss 2013: 19).
It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations, which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by shewing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. (Hume 1777: §8.7)
Human beings are physical, and our behaviour is bodily. Yet predicting and explaining our behaviour as a branch of pure physics is a task of unimaginable complexity – nor would it look remotely like economics (because the economic individual is not a distinctive class of entity, physically speaking).
The economic domain begins with choice behaviour, intentional decisions to perform a certain action.
To explain decisions, once we’ve narrowed them down from behaviour more generally, is to rationalize them: to show that the action is the product of the agent’s reasons:
Whenever someone does something for a reason, therefore, he can be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude toward actions of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind. (Davidson 1963: 685)
A rationalizing explanation for an intentional action cites a reason. This is explanatory only if we assume a certain psychological theory, namely, that reasons cause actions.
a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason. (Davidson 1963: 691)
Folk psychology is ‘the everyday theory of human rationality’ (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2017: 55), which explains actions by (i) citing reason-constituting internal states of the individual – beliefs and desires – and (ii) noting that one such reason caused the action to be explained (Reiss 2013: 30–31). This is thus a species of causal explanation.
A prior sceptical worry arises: are there any actions to be explained?
With human beings there is a natural presumption that they are like us; but what about other sorts of entities we may want to include in economic explanations?
Interpretativism: if an entity can be globally rationalized by an accepted theory, they are an agent:
We suppose that people tend to behave in a way that serves their desires according to their beliefs. We should take this principle of instrumental rationality to be neither descriptive nor normative but constitutive of belief. It enters into the implicit definition of what it is for someone to have a certain system of belief [and desire]. (Lewis 1986b: 36)
One fundamental constraint: we should ascribe beliefs and desires so as to make a behaviour a rational action by the standards of folk psychology (Lewis 1974: 337–38).
Suppose we idealise, and let the agent be certain of the state of the world.
This give rise to a preference relation. It is convenient to express this in terms of weak preference: A weakly prefers \(x\) to \(y\), symbolised \(x \succeq y\), if (roughly) they regard outcome \(x\) as no worse than, and possibly better than, outcome \(y\). (Strict preference: \(x \succ y\) iff \(x \succeq y\) and \(y \not \succeq x\).)
What preferences over outcomes are rational? Any that satisfy the following (Reiss 2013: 37; Peterson 2017: 99):
Do we really have complete preferences between arbitrary outcomes?
It is dinner-time. Should we go to the Indian restaurant or the Chinese restaurant? We have visited both many times. We know their pluses and minuses. The Indian restaurant is less far to walk. It serves up a sublime mango lassi. The Chinese restaurant is cheaper. Its raucous atmosphere is more child-friendly. All in all it is a wash for me. I have no all-things considered preference between:
- Our going to the Indian restaurant.
and
- Our going to the Chinese restaurant.
And learning that it is dollar-off day at either restaurant will not give me an all-things-considered preference. When I compare B to:
- Our going to the Indian restaurant and saving $1. …
it remains a wash for me. I have no all-things-considered preference between C and B … though I do prefer C to A…. (Hare 2010: 238; cf. Peterson 2017: 184–86)
In the case of the dinner, the agent must have incomplete preferences. If their lack of preference means they are indifferent between A and B, then they prefer C to B; but they don’t.
So they neither prefer A to B, nor prefer B to A, nor do they rank them equally. They simply have no ranking at all (Reiss 2013: 40).
We might opt for something weaker:
That leaves it open which preference should be added – maybe both are compatible with what your current preferences are.
So mere completability does not give rise to a preference ranking – completeness and transitivity do (Hausman, McPherson, and Satz 2017: 58).
In any case, if an agent has transitive and complete preference among alternative outcomes, then they can have the outcomes ranked numerically (Reiss 2013: 38).
Such a function \(U\) is called an ordinal utility function, and it represents a preference ordering on outcomes: higher numbers are more preferred.
This is not of interest in itself (the conditions on preference are very strong) – rather (I think) it shows how my values are reflected in my preferences, if my values have a numerical representation.
Some terminology: my personal or subjective utility in some outcome is the value I personally assign to the state of affairs in which that outcome obtains. It is the numerical representation of degree of desire – that is why, under certainty, it licenses preference.
For example, these (partial) rankings of possible actions for A:
Act\Outcome | Utility-1 | Utility-2 | Utility-3 |
---|---|---|---|
donate to family planning charity | 17 | 2.7 | 900 |
keep money for self | 8 | 2.6 | 20 |
donate to ‘just say no’ drug education | -7 | 2 | 1 |
The numbers don’t matter: if there is a utility function representing A’s preferences, then there are many, because any other function \(U'\) where \(U'(x) > U'(y)\) iff \(U(x)>U(y)\) would also give the same order.
Our agent acts rationally iff they can be represented as choosing the outcome which has the highest utility.
If A is ignorant of the actual world state, then A can’t choose to act based wholly on utility.
A given act will have different outcomes as consequences, depending on the unknown state of the world, and those outcomes might have quite different values to the agent. Consider:
Jill is a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient, John, who has a minor but not trivial skin complaint. She has three drugs to choose from: drug A, drug B, and drug C. Careful consideration of the literature has led her to the following opinions. Drug A is very likely to relieve the condition but will not completely cure it. One of drugs B and C will completely cure the skin condition; the other though will kill the patient, and there is no way that she can tell which of the two is the perfect cure and which the killer drug. What should Jill do? (Jackson 1991: 462–63)
The intuitive answer is: prescribe drug A. How do we obtain it?
The economic literature has distinguished two kinds of ignorance (Reiss 2013: 42–43):
These can be given a unified treatment in the Bayesian framework:
Since an agent’s evidence about the chances informs their degrees of belief (e.g., if you think a coin is fair, your degree of belief in heads should equal the \(0.5\) chance) we can treat all decisions as decisions under uncertainty with subjective probabilities over outcomes.
If one is uncertain, then every action is a prospect (or gamble, or lottery): which outcome eventuates depends on something you don’t know (Reiss 2013: 43).
But it can be quite reasonable to prefer some prospects to others.
What is rational preference between prospects?
Just as in the case of certain decision-making, it is supposed that preference should be negatively transitive and should be complete.
It is also supposed that rational preference satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives:
Here are some utilities which license these preferences; we simplify to assume that \(A\) leads with certainty to a cure:
Acts\States | Drug B kills/C cures | Drug C kills/B cures | EU |
---|---|---|---|
\(A\) | 90 | 90 | 90 |
\(B\) | 0 | 100 | \(100p \approx 50\) |
\(C\) | 100 | 0 | \(100 - 100p \approx 50\) |
\(EU(A) > EU(B)\), mirroring \(A \succ B\); \(EU(B) \approx EU(C)\), mirroring \(B \sim C\); etc.
So we can represent Jill’s preferences as the product of her belief (degrees of belief) and some attribution of utilities to outcomes (conjunctions of acts and states).
Again, interpretivism says that we attribute these ‘subjective desirabilities’ as real psychological states of Jill on the basis of her total preferences, revealed globally in her behaviour.